The Democrats should drive the Administration to more carefully consider the interests of Third World allies
President Bouteflika has left Bejing with a package of diplomatic and ecnomic agreements, following the Beijing Summit on China-Africa Cooperation earlier this week. The agreement reflects in part, Algeria's grand strategy, and opens the door for forming a new American policy towards Algeria in the wake of the Democratic coup.
According to The People's Daily, China has supported Algeria's quest towards joining the WTO, as of Monday, after a gushing session between the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.
Additionally, the meeting resulted in the extension of Approved Destination Status in Algeria to Chinese students, and included "agreements covering economy, taxation, civil aviation, judicial services, quality inspection and quarantine after a joint statement was signed by leaders of both countries to facilitate strategic partnership."
Both countries further pledged to enhance their strategic relations in the political and cultural realms. Building on a tradition of warm Sino-Algerian relations, it should be easy for these efforts to come to fruition.
Bouteflika took to praising the Chinese model of global integration, and encouraging continued co-operation between the two nations, whose diplomatic, military, and political ties reach back to the years of the Algerian revolution. China was the only communist nation to recognize the Algerian Provisional Government when it was announced in 1958, and official Algerian delegations visited Beijing no less than five times that year. Indeed, these delegationsdetailed arrangements both for the financing of Algerian arms purchases in the Middle East and Europe by an interest-free loan ("to be repaid after independence") and for the training of selected Algerian officers in China are believed to have been made as early as the spring of 1959. (Ed. Brezinski, Zbigniew, Africa and the Communist World, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963, pp.162-63)
I should add that the agreements make little mention of arms. This, as
Liberte put it, leaves China "jostling among the great powers regarding the sale of weapons." Algerian grand-strategy seems to be centered around diversifying the sources of Algerian arms and diplomatic resources. Last year, when the now
jobless Donald Rumsfeld visited the Maghreb, Bouteflika's requests for American fighters and other weaponry was handedly denied, probably as punishment for Algeria's then recent arms deal with Russia, and for fear of triggering a North African arms race between Algeria and Morocco (traditionally, Morocco has used American jets, while Algeria's have been purchased from the old Soviet Union, its satellites, and more recently from China; many of these are outdated, and Algeria has been looking to modernize its air force).
Liberte also notes that Bouteflika has been itching the scalp of the US since his visit to Cuba in September, where he
chaired the G-15 meeting,
met with the ailing Cuban president, and
made "certain burning declarations". This meeting with the "
l’antiaméricain chronique," has irritated some of my sources inside Washington who had hoped to incorporate Algeria into the anti-neo-Third Worldist camp (my wording, not theirs). Chavez has made many overtures to Algeria in the field of gas and anti-Americanism, much of which have been met with a luke warm feeling, but have been embraced nonetheless. Bouteflika has rejected American plans for the Greater Middle East, and the parliament has strengthened state control over the energy sector in recent months. Again, as
Liberte mentions, Algeria has become in recent years a "pivot state," a nation of supreme importance in the War on Terror and somewhat sympathetic to American security concerns, but by no means a rainy day ally.
The material effects of Algeria's relationship with the anti-Americans, for lack of a better term, are difficult to discern. Economically, the US has not taken measures contrary to Algerian interests with the aim of coercing Algeria into co-operation. The only visible sign is the refusal of the United States to provide Algeria with next generation military supplies in the manner that it does to its traditional allies, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf States. Hawkish American policy has turned many -- if not most -- Algerian off to the idea of being allied with the United States, and if Bouteflika were to form such an alliance, it would most certainly be met with objection. The American invasion of Iraq, as I have written previously, has greatly harmed its relationship with its allies, both traditional (Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) and fair weather (Algeria, the post-Syrian Lebanese factions, etc.). The Algerian case shows the necessity of a new American policy as a new American government comes into office. If the Americans plan on cementing friendships with the nations of the Third World, it should regard the interests of these states.
While the spread of democracy like a great wild fire may be rhetorically appealing, it is indeed contrary to the notion of an alliance in this modern world. One of the primary purposes that nations enter alliances, besides the fact that they share a common security concern, is that they wish to preserve themselves. A nation does not enter a pact with another nation for the sake of stirring a revolution within itself. It enters that alliance to strengthen itself.
If the United States wishes to make an ally out of Algeria, and conduct effective statecraft among the other states in the Middle East and North Africa, it ought to reevaluate the manner in which it goes about voicing its policy. Regime change in Iraq opened a regional power vacuum, which added an extra variable to the region’s security complex that did not exist there today. This vacuum has been filled by Iran, which has introduced other variables, such as Venezuela and an even bolder Russia, the region.
Those regimes whose policies were up for grabs before the war, have been forced to make and choice, and by now most have. Algeria is still attempting to pursue an independent foreign policy, but in a region and world whose new, post-
Pax Americana poles are taking shape ever more clearly each day, this cannot last for long.
The current climate serves Algeria’s grand strategy well, though. Algeria has long held a policy of non-Alignment. While it has typically leaned towards the camp of the global left, the anti-colonialists, and the revolutionaries, there are more than a few instances where Algeria has cooperated with Western nations where their interests were congruent. The new international system allows Algerian to oscillate between East and West, and to more effectively push its interests. The greater and lesser powers must
compete of Algeria’s (and much the rest of the world's) diplomatic and economic support (in exchange for energy) in exchange for arms, investment, and all the rest.
This should not be viewed as a threat. While Sino-Algerian and Russo-Algerian relations have historically been rather warm, American-Algerian relations have been cordial, though mutual suspicion has always existed as a result of Cold War mentalities and issues, not to mention the Palestinian matter. But, there is no intrinsic gaffe between the two nations.
The United States was one of the first international stops made by Ahmed Ben Bella, though this visited was immediately followed up by a visit to Cuba (which aroused the suspicion of Washington). Algerians have sided with the United States in several key votes at the UN, and have rarely taken or supported actions that were antithetical to American national security. Cooperation between Algeria and the European nations on terrorism, especially since the 1980’s has been extensive. Algeria has supported the American
Pan-Sahel initiative, and has even allowed American forces to train Algerian troops. President Bouteflika was the first head of state to send his condolences to President Bush on the occasion of 9/11.
There is no reason that the United States and Algeria should have hostile relations; the US must understand that Algeria’s interest lie in diversification and not in subservience or preemptive strikes. The interests of Algeria, and other states like her, are primarily economic and structural, that is, primarily interested in modernizing their domestic infrastructure, economy, and military. In some cases, such as Algeria's it is somewhat of a reconstruction. While the interests of the US and the non-Allied camp may not always coincide exactly, they do not have to for a healthy working relationship to take shape. The non-Allied are non-allied for exactly this reason. The
new American leadership should take this into account when formulating its policy towards the nations of the Third World.